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EXPANDING PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE RECORD 
RENTAL AMENDMENT BEYOND THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 
by                                                                                                                         
Ryan Vacca* 
This Article explores the development of copyright law’s first sale 
doctrine and the Record Rental Amendment (RRA) in light of the Sixth 
Circuit’s interpretation of the RRA in Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights 
Cross Communications, Inc. This Article does not take issue with the 
court’s conclusion, but instead uses the differing conclusions of the 
majority and dissent to illustrate that the RRA exception is in need of 
Congressional clarification. This Article also examines whether the 
Record Rental Amendment should be amended to include audiobooks and 
other non-musical works, concluding that they should.  The author then 
proposes two alternative amendments to the RRA; one to expand its 
scope to cover non-musical phonorecords, and one to clarify that it does 
not. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2007, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Brilliance 
Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc.1 and answered a lingering 
question concerning the Copyright Act that had persisted for over twenty years. 
The court decided whether the protections offered to the music industry under 
the poorly drafted Record Rental Amendment of 1984 (Act) also extended to 
audiobooks.2 This Act deprives owners of tapes and compact discs from renting 
those items to others without the consent of the copyright owners of the 
recorded song and the written lyrics and music—a right historically granted to 
all purchasers of books, magazines, albums, tapes, and compact disks under the 
first sale doctrine. 
Ultimately, the court held the protections granted by the Record Rental 
Amendment were limited to the music industry.3 However, both the majority 
and vigorous dissenting opinions highlighted the differing interpretations of the 
Act’s applicability and set the stage for a circuit split. 
This Article explores the text and historical developments of copyright 
law’s first sale doctrine and the Record Rental Amendment and how the Sixth 
Circuit interpreted it. Moreover, this Article examines whether the Record 
Rental Amendment should be amended to include audiobooks and other non-
musical works and ultimately suggests two alternative amendments Congress 
should adopt to resolve future conflicts and avoid a split amongst the circuits. 
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
A. The Exclusive Right to Distribute 
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the 
power “To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”4 Consistent with this power, Congress has, over the 
                                                          
1 474 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2007). 
2 Id. at 368. 
3 Id. at 374. 
4 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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years, adopted a series of Copyright Acts.5 Today, the Copyright Act provides 
copyright owners with several exclusive rights,6 including the right “to 
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale 
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”7 
Before discussing what this right entails, a couple terms must be defined. 
“Phonorecords” are defined as “material objects in which sounds, other than 
those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work,8 are fixed by 
any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the 
aid of a machine or device.”9 Phonorecords include the material object in 
which the sounds are first fixed.10 Examples of phonorecords are compact discs 
(“CDs”), tapes, and vinyl albums. 
“Copies” are defined as “material objects, other than phonorecords, in 
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from 
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”11 Copies include “the 
material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.”12 
Examples of a copy would be a book containing a copyrighted story and a 
magazine or newspaper containing a copyrighted article. For our purposes, the 
only difference is phonorecords apply to sounds while copies apply to 
everything else. 
Thus, the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords to the public 
means the copyright owner of a song or story can sell a CD or book containing 
                                                          
5 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:1.1-7 (Thomson West 2007) 
(noting Congress created the initial copyright act in 1790 and made omnibus revisions in 
1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976). 
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000), which grants to copyright owners the rights: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means 
of a digital audio transmission. 
7 Id. § 106(3). 
8 Audiovisual works are defined as: 
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be 
shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic 
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the 
material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied. 
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the song or story and has the power to exclude others from engaging in these 
activities.13 Although the right to distribute applies to copies and phonorecords, 
this Article is primarily concerned with the distribution of phonorecords. 
B. The First Sale Doctrine: An Exception to Exclusivity 
Although the Copyright Act purports to grant copyright owners the 
exclusive right to distribute phonorecords and copies of their works, this 
exclusive right is not without bounds. The first sale doctrine is an exception 
restricting this exclusive distribution right. It attempts to balance the rights of 
copyright owners with the rights of purchasers of phonorecords and copies. 
1. The First Sale Doctrine in its Current Form 
In general, the first sale doctrine provides that once the copyright owner 
has transferred ownership of a particular phonorecord or copy, the new owner 
can redistribute by resale, rental, or loan, that copy without the consent of the 
copyright owner and without infringing the copyright owner’s exclusive right 
of distribution.14 The doctrine is codified in section 109(a) of the 1976 
Copyright Act.15 Section 109(a) states, in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the exclusive right to 
publicly distribute], the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is 
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise 
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.16 
In other words, once a consumer buys a phonorecord or copy, the 
copyright owner’s permission is unnecessary for the consumer to sell, trade, or 
otherwise dispose of that phonorecord or copy.17 The consumer is, in effect, 
authorized to distribute that particular phonorecord or copy. It is important to 
note that under section 109(a), the consumer is only exempted from the 
exclusive right to distribute. The same is not true for the other exclusive rights 
granted by the Copyright Act.18 It is also worth noting that although named the 
“first sale doctrine,” the disposition of the phonorecord or copy may be made 
                                                          
13 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A] (Matthew 
Bender & Co., Inc. 2006) [hereinafter NIMMER]. 
14 Judith K. Smith, The Computer Software Rental Act: Amending the ‘First Sale 
Doctrine’ to Protect Computer Software Copyright, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1613, 1624 
(1987). 
15 The Copyright Act does permit a purchaser of a copy to publicly display that copy 
without violating the copyright owner’s exclusive right to publicly display the copyrighted 
work. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2000). 
16 Id. § 109(a) (emphasis added). 
17 Cary T. Platkin, In Search of a Compromise to the Music Industry’s Used CD 
Dilemma, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 509, 514–15 (1995). 
18 NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[D] (citing Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc., 
940 F. Supp. 86, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (reproduction); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. 
Supp. 741, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (adaptation); and Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd 
Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984) (performance)). But see supra note 15 
(discussing the right to publicly display a copy). 
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by gift, devise, or operation of law without upsetting the legal effect of the 
doctrine.19 
If, on the other hand, the copyright owner does not wholly divest itself of 
title in the phonorecord or copy embodying the copyrighted work (e.g. the song 
or the story), then the first sale doctrine is inapplicable. For example, if the 
copyright owner leased the phonorecord or copy, then the lessee would infringe 
the copyright owner’s distribution right if, without the copyright owner’s 
consent, the lessee sold, leased, or lent the phonorecord or copy to another.20 
Therefore, if I write a song, record myself singing it, put this recording on a CD 
(a phonorecord), lend it to you, and you in turn sell it on eBay, then you will 
have not only unlawfully sold my CD, you will have also committed copyright 
infringement by exercising my exclusive right to distribute my song. Thus, 
“mere authorized possession of a [phonorecord or copy], if title in the tangible 
[phonorecord or copy] does not pass to the possessor, does not trigger the 
limitation of Section 109(a), and hence does not affect the copyright owner’s 
rights under Section 106(3).”21 Under the same line of reasoning, licensing a 
phonorecord or copy is also not covered under the first sale doctrine.22 
2. The Historical Development of the First Sale Doctrine 
Reviewing the genesis and historical development of the first sale doctrine 
is useful in understanding its original purpose and continued validity. The first 
sale doctrine’s origin is confused at best. Some have linked the doctrine to the 
Sherman Act’s prohibition against restraints on trade.23 Others argue it derives 
from the English common law rules disapproving of restraints on the alienation 
of property as this was viewed as elemental to ownership.24 In 1907, the Sixth 
Circuit, commenting on restrictions upon sales and resales, stated: 
A prime objection to the enforceability of such a system of restraint upon 
sales and prices is that they offend against the ordinary and usual 
freedom of traffic in chattels or articles which pass by mere delivery. The 
right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general 
property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally 
                                                          
19 John M. Kernochan, The Distribution Right in the United States of America: Review 
and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1410 (1989); NIMMER, supra note 13,  
§ 8.12[B][1][a]. See also Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 477 F.3d 128, 
142–43 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that entry of judgment in a copyright infringement suit 
transforms a copy from unlawful to lawful for purposes of the first sale doctrine). 
20 NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][1][a] (citing Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve 
Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. 170, 1983 WL 1147 (W.D. Tex. 1983)). 
21 Id. 
22 Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 212–13 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1314 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990). 
23 Sharon Billington, Relief from Online Used Book Sales During New Book Launches, 
29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497, 512 (2006). 
24 Kernochan, supra note 19, at 1412; David H. Horowitz, The Record Rental 
Amendment of 1984: A Case Study in the Effort to Adapt Copyright Law to New Technology, 
12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 31 (1987). 
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regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best subserved by great 
freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to hand.25 
Two related socioeconomic arguments have also been put forth. One is 
that the first sale doctrine permits access to works where the copyright owner 
might otherwise suppress the information.26 The second is the doctrine “creates 
secondary markets, which lead to more affordable used versions of copyrighted 
works and helps to serve members of the public who lack the means or 
opportunity to buy the items new.”27 
Some commentators identify the Supreme Court’s 1908 decision Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus28 as the origin of the first sale doctrine under U.S. 
copyright law.29 However, earlier precedent for the first sale doctrine existed at 
least as far back as 1894.30 Notwithstanding the foregoing, Bobbs-Merrill lays 
a strong foundation for the historical discussion of the first sale doctrine. 
In Bobbs-Merrill, the plaintiff was the copyright owner of a novel entitled 
The Castaway.31 One of the initial pages of the book contained a notice: “The 
price of this book at retail is one dollar. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less 
price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the 
copyright.”32 The defendant purchased copies of The Castaway from 
wholesalers and, with knowledge of the notice, sold copies at the retail level for 
eighty-nine cents without the consent of the plaintiff.33 The plaintiff sued 
arguing the defendant infringed upon the plaintiff’s exclusive right to “vend” 
by selling The Castaway at less than one dollar per copy.34 The Court rejected 
this argument and held: 
To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future 
retail sales . . . would give a right not included in the terms of the statute, 
and, in our view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its 
meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative 
intent in its enactment.35 
                                                          
25 John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907). 
26 Billington, supra note 23, at 508. 
27 Id. 
28 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
29 See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1470 
(2004); Platkin, supra note 17, at 515–16. 
30 See Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894). For a thorough 
examination of the historical analysis of the first sale doctrine, including its relationship with 
copyright, antitrust, and patent cases, see Billington, supra note 23, at 512–24. 
31 Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 341. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 341–42. 
34 The Copyright Act in effect in 1908 granted copyright owners the “sole liberty of 
printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending.” See 
id at 348. 
35 Id. at 351. 
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Interestingly, the Court in Bobbs-Merrill appeared to base its decision merely 
on the statutory language of the Copyright Act and did not articulate a policy 
basis for this reading.36 
In 1909, a year after Bobbs-Merrill was decided, Congress revised the 
Copyright Act and, for the first time, codified the first sale doctrine.37 Section 
27 of the 1909 Copyright Act provided: 
The copyright is distinct from the property in the material object 
copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the 
material object shall not of itself constitute a transfer of the copyright, 
nor shall the assignment of the copyright constitute a transfer of the title 
to the material object; but nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid, 
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the 
possession of which has been lawfully obtained.38 
Like the Court in Bobbs-Merrill, Congress indicated no policy basis in 
either the statute or the legislative history to show why the first sale doctrine 
was advisable.39 The most illuminating comment is in the House Report on the 
1909 Act explaining, “it would be most unwise to permit the copyright 
proprietor to exercise any control whatever over the article which is the subject 
of copyright after said proprietor has made the first sale.”40 
The next major revision to the Copyright Act occurred in 1976, which 
codified the first sale doctrine in section 109(a).41 This reaffirmation of the first 
sale doctrine originally read: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any 
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that 
copy or phonorecord.42 
This codification of the first sale doctrine is similar, but not identical to 
section 27 of the 1909 Copyright Act.43 In particular, it reflected the distinction 
drawn between the definitions of copies and phonorecords. Nonetheless, it is 
clear Congress was merely confirming the principle and not substantively 
changing it.44 
                                                          
36 Robinson, supra note 29, at 1470. For an interesting discussion about the case 
history of Bobbs-Merrill and the associated antitrust litigation, see Billington, supra note 23, 
at 519–22. 
37 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075. 
38 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1946 & Supp. III 1950). The copyright laws were codified as Title 
17 of the United States Code in 1947 and the first sale doctrine was renumbered section 27. 
See Platkin, supra note 17, at 516 n.45. 
39 Robinson, supra note 29, at 1471. 
40 H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 19 (1909). 
41 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1976). 
42 Id. 
43 NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B]. 
44 The House Report for section 109 indicates that: 
[Section 109(a)] restates and confirms the principle that, where the copyright owner has 
transferred ownership of a particular copy or phonorecord of a work, the person to 
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III. THE RECORD RENTAL AMENDMENT: AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
EXCEPTION 
A. The Historical Context 
Soon after the 1976 Copyright Act was passed, the record industry began 
to lobby Congress for an exception to the first sale doctrine.45 In the early 
1980s, the Japanese record rental business was booming.46 By 1983, there were 
more than 1,600 rental shops.47 In a survey conducted in Japan, over ninety-
seven percent of rental customers stated they made home recordings of the 
records they rented.48 Furthermore, more than sixty-one percent of those 
customers loaned or gave copied tapes to others, thus further expanding the 
number of phonorecords generated by rented albums.49 As a result of this 
widespread rental market, retail sales for records plummeted thirty percent.50 
The success of record rental businesses began spreading to other countries and 
hit the United States in September 1981, in Providence, Rhode Island.51 
The record industry complained that the record rental business was a 
growing phenomenon and piracy threatened enormous financial losses.52 As a 
result of this threat, the record industry argued, “[T]he quantity and diversity of 
new musical releases available to consumers [would] diminish” and “prices of 
prerecorded discs and tapes [would] likely . . . be forced upward.”53 
Of additional concern to the record industry was the introduction of the 
CD. The CD not only provided better sound quality than a record, “it was not 
subject to the wear and tear and consequent degradation of listening quality 
                                                                                                                                      
whom the copy or phonorecord is transferred is entitled to dispose of it by sale, rental, 
or any other means. Under this principle, which has been established by the court 
decisions and section 27 of the present law, the copyright owner’s exclusive right of 
public distribution would have no effect upon anyone who owns “a particular copy or 
phonorecord lawfully made under this title” and who wishes to transfer it to someone 
else or to destroy it. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693. Section 
109(a) was again amended in 1994 pursuant to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and 
added a second sentence to address works of foreign origin resurrected from the United 
States’ public domain. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B]; see also Act of Dec. 8, 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-465, § 514(b), 108 Stat. 4809. The 1994 amendment is beyond the scope of this 
Article and irrelevant for this discussion; as such, it is sufficient to note that the codification 
of the first sale doctrine today is identical to that of 1976. 
45 Platkin, supra note 17, at 517. 





51 Id. at 33. 
52 Smith, supra note 14, at 1636. 
53 Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine: Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029 and S. 32 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 19–20 (1985) (joint statement of AGAC/The 
Songwriters Guild, the National Association of Recording Merchandisers, The National 
Music Publishers’ Association and The Record Industry Association of America). 
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experienced with [records].”54 This new technology supplemented the record 
industry’s fear that what happened in Japan with records would occur in the 
United States, but at an increased level. 
In 1983, at the record industry’s urging, Congress examined the impact of 
phonorecord rentals.55 From its investigation, Congress learned that record 
stores were renting phonorecords for twenty-four to seventy-two hour time 
periods for fees of 99¢ to $2.50 per phonorecord while selling blank audio 
cassette tapes at the same time.56 “It was obvious that virtually everyone 
obtaining phonorecords by rental did so for the sole purpose of making audio 
tape reproductions of the rented material.”57 In fact, one of the nearly two 
hundred commercial record rental stores advertised “NEVER, EVER BUY 
ANOTHER RECORD.”58 Another simply stated “SAVE MONEY, RENT 
ANY LP OR 45, TAKE IT HOME PUT IT ON TAPE AND RETURN IT.”59 
Congress was persuaded. Despite nearly a century of the first sale doctrine 
remaining largely undisturbed, Congress made a drastic change in 1984, which 
created an exception to the first sale doctrine (i.e. an exception to the exception 
to exclusivity). The exception was the Record Rental Amendment (the “RRA 
exception”).60 
B. Section 109(b)(1)(A) 
The current version of section 109(b)(1)(A) of the Copyright Act, which 
codified the RRA exception, states in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) [the first sale doctrine], 
unless authorized by the owners of copyright in the sound recording or 
the owner of copyright in a computer program (including any tape, disk, 
or other medium embodying such program), and in the case of a sound 
recording in the musical works embodied therein, neither the owner of a 
particular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular copy 
of a computer program (including any tape, disk, or other medium 
embodying such program), may, for the purposes of direct or indirect 
commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the 
possession of that phonorecord or computer program (including any tape, 
disk, or other medium embodying such program) by rental, lease, or 
                                                          
54 Horowitz, supra note 24, at 33. 
55 Lawrence J. Glusman, It’s My Copy, Right? Music Industry Power to Control 
Growing Resale Markets in Used Digital Audio Recordings, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 709, 720 
(1995). 
56 H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899; 
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7]. 
57 NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 8.12[B][7]. 
58 H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899. 
59 Horowitz, supra note 24, at 33, citing Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine: 
Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029, S. 31 98th Cong. 31 (1983–84) (joint statement of 
AGAC/The Songwriters Guild, The National Association of Recording Merchandisers, The 
National Music Publishers’ Association and the Recording Industry of America). 
60 Record Rental Amendment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified 
at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1) (1984)). For a complete history of the Record Rental Amendment 
of 1984, see generally Horowitz, supra note 24. 
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lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or 
lending.61 
Much of the verbosity of this sentence was added by the Computer 
Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990.62 Prior to this amendment, the RRA 
exception read, in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) [the first sale doctrine], 
unless authorized by the owners of copyright in the sound recording and 
in the musical works embodied therein, the owner of a particular 
phonorecord may not, for purposes of direct or indirect commercial 
advantage dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that 
phonorecord by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice in 
the nature of rental, lease, or lending.63 
A few comments about the boundaries of the RRA exception are necessary 
before applying it to the problem raised in this Article. 
First, a discussion of sound recordings and musical works is helpful. The 
Copyright Act defines sound recordings as “works that result from the fixation 
of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds 
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the 
nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in 
which they are embodied.”64 In other words, except for soundtracks and sounds 
accompanying audiovisual works,65 sound recordings are the audible parts of a 
copyrighted work; this is in contrast to the written part of the copyrighted work. 
The Copyright Act does not define the term “musical works,” but this generally 
refers to the tangible expression that may later be used to create a sound 
recording. An example may clarify the meaning of these terms. When a 
songwriter writes lyrics or prepares the written music for song, this would be 
considered the musical work and is entitled to copyright protection. If the 
songwriter then goes to the studio to record the song, the result is a sound 
recording (i.e. what you hear on the radio). As described supra, the sound 
recording will be embodied in a phonorecord, such as a CD.66 But sound 
recordings are not limited to those based upon musical works. As noted in the 
definition of sound recordings, these sounds can also include spoken words or 
                                                          
61 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
62 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1) 
(1990)). This act added computer software to the items partially exempted from the first sale 
doctrine. Much has been written on this topic, but is beyond the scope of this Article. For 
additional information see NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][8]. For the sake of 
completeness, it should be noted that section 109(b) also contains a limited exception for 
nonprofit libraries. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)(A) (2000). This nonprofit library exception is 
really an exception to the exception to the exception to exclusivity. 
63 Record Rental Amendment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified 
at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)). 
64 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
65 See supra note 8 for the definition of “audiovisual works.” 
66 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
LCB_11_3_ART2_VACCA.DOC 9/15/2007 1:01:26 PM 
2007] PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT BEYOND MUSIC INDUSTRY 615 
other sounds.67 An example of a sound recording not containing musical works 
is an audiobook.68 
Second, and as a corollary to the first point, it should be noted that there 
are two potential consents that must be obtained. One is from the copyright 
owner of the sound recording. The other is from the copyright owner of the 
musical work. Although these may be the same person, they can be, and often 
are, different. Thus, if I write a song and you record it with my permission,69 
then someone wishing to rent the CD with your recording would need both of 
our consents. 
Third, the RRA exception only limits the first sale doctrine as it pertains to 
renting, leasing, lending, or “any other act or practice in the nature of rental, 
lease, or lending.”70 Purchasers of phonorecords are free to sell their 
phonorecord pursuant to the first sale doctrine without fear of infringing the 
copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute.71 
Fourth, it should be noted that the RRA exception only applies to 
phonorecords and not copies.72 As noted supra, phonorecords are the material 
objects embodying sounds, whereas copies, in essence, embody everything 
else.73 Sheet music would be an example of a copy. Therefore, the purchaser of 
sheet music would be permitted to rent, lease, or lend the sheet music to others 
pursuant to the first sale doctrine without running afoul of the RRA exception. 
Fifth, the RRA exception only forbids renting, leasing, lending, and the 
like if done “for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage.”74 
Although not in the context of the RRA exception, this phrase has been 
interpreted in reference to other sections of the Copyright Act to mean “for 
profit.”75 Thus, one who simply lends a phonorecord to a friend and does not 
charge would not fall within the ambit of the RRA exception. 
                                                          
67 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
68 Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 368 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
69 My permission is needed because I have the exclusive right to prepare derivative 
works from my written song, such as a sound recording thereof. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
70 Id. § 109(b)(1)(A). The “any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or 
lending” language used in the RRA exception was intended “to cover transactions which 
common sense indicates are equivalent to rentals, but which may be disguised in an attempt 
to avoid liability under the law.” H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2901. The House Report gives the following example: 
[A] retailer who “sold” an album to be “bought back” a few days later, or a club 
organized to lend records to its members who paid a membership fee rather than a 
direct rental fee, would be performing acts or practices in the nature of rental, lease, or 
lending and would be in violation of the law unless permission of the copyright owners 
had been obtained. 
71 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][a]. 
72 NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][a]. 
73 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
74 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). 
75 NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][b]. 
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With these boundaries of the RRA exception established, it is clear that 
one who purchases a CD containing music may not rent, lease, or lend it out for 
commercial advantage without securing the proper consents. 
IV. IS THE RECORD RENTAL AMENDMENT EXCEPTION LIMITED TO 
MUSICAL PHONORECORDS? 
Although the RRA exception clearly prevents the renting, leasing, or 
lending of musical phonorecords,76 a question remains as to its applicability to 
non-musical phonorecords, such as audiobooks or stand-up comedy albums. 
This precise question was recently addressed as a matter of first impression by 
the Sixth Circuit in Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, 
Inc. and led to a split opinion by the panel.77 
In Brilliance Audio, the plaintiff was in the business of producing and 
selling audiobooks.78 The plaintiff had exclusive agreements with publishers 
and authors to prepare sound recordings based on literary works.79 As a result, 
the plaintiff owned copyrights in the sound recordings.80 The defendant, a 
competitor of the plaintiff, was alleged to have purchased the plaintiff’s 
audiobooks, repackaged and relabeled them as its own, and then distributed 
them by rental, lease, and lending without authority from the plaintiff.81 The 
plaintiff filed suit alleging, inter alia, copyright infringement based upon its 
exclusive right to distribute.82 The defendant moved to dismiss the copyright 
infringement claim arguing it was protected by the first sale doctrine.83 The 
plaintiff argued audiobooks fell within the RRA exception and therefore the 
defendant’s renting, leasing, and lending of the audiobooks were not protected 
under the first sale doctrine unless the plaintiff’s consent was obtained.84 The 
district court held the RRA exception only applied to musical phonorecords, 
not recorded literary works, and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.85 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit was presented with the question of whether 
the RRA exception to the first sale doctrine applies to all phonorecords or only 
                                                          
76 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. A.L.W., Ltd., 855 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1988). 
77 Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 374 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
78 Id. at 368. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 369. 
82 Id. The plaintiff also brought trademark infringement, unfair competition, and 
trademark dilution claims. The district court dismissed these claims under trademark law’s 
application of the first sale doctrine, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for 
additional proceedings on these claims. Id. at 374. Because of the different purposes of 
trademark and copyright law, application of the first sale doctrine in the trademark context is 
not germane to the discussion of the first sale doctrine in the copyright context. 
83 Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1236 
(W.D. Mich. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 374. 
84 Id. at 1240. 
85 Id. at 1241. 
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phonorecords of musical works.86 The plaintiff sought a broad reading of the 
RRA exception, which included all phonorecords.87 Under this approach, 
audiobooks would fall within the bounds of the RRA exception and others 
would be prohibited from renting, leasing, or lending audiobooks without the 
copyright owner’s authority. The defendant, on the other hand, sought a 
reading of the RRA exception, limiting it to musical phonorecords, thus 
causing audiobooks to remain under the protection of the first sale doctrine and 
outside the bounds of infringement.88 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The majority began its analysis by noting that it first must try to determine 
Congress’ intended meaning of the RRA exception and to do this, it must first 
look to the language of the statute itself.89 The court acknowledged two 
potential readings of the RRA exception. 
The first potential reading was that “the statute applies only when a sound 
recording has ‘musical works embodied therein,’” because “[e]xtending the 
exception to audiobooks would read the ‘musical works’ clause out of the 
statute.”90 In other words, the consent of the copyright owner of the musical 
sound recordings is required as well as the consent of the copyright owner of 
the underlying musical work.91 Under this reading, only musical sound 
recordings are encompassed by the RRA exception. 
The second potential reading of the RRA exception was that “the statute 
requires obtaining the permission of the owner of the copyright in the sound 
recording regardless of whether the second permission—that of the copyright 
in the underlying work—is needed.”92 In other words, “For a musical 
recording, the second permission is necessary; for a recording of a literary 
work, it is not.”93 
The court found both readings to be plausible, thus creating an ambiguity 
in the RRA exception.94 Because the statutory text was not clear, the court 
                                                          
86 Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 368. 







94 Id. The Sixth Circuit is not alone in its belief that the statutory language is 
ambiguous and there are two plausible interpretations. Professor Nimmer states: 
Apparently, there is no legislative history relating to this issue, and the language of 
Section 109(b)(1)(A) itself is ambiguous. . . . This may be read as requiring the consent 
of only those copyright owners of sound recordings that in fact embody musical works 
(as well as of the copyright owners of such musical works). Alternatively, it may be 
read as requiring the consent of the copyright owners of all sound recordings, as well as 
the consent of the copyright owners of any musical works that may be embodied 
therein, but as not requiring the consent of the copyright owners of any literary or 
dramatic works that may be embodied therein. 
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noted it should look to other authority to discern its meaning.95 The court’s 
reasoning was guided by the legislative history, the context in which the statue 
was passed, and policy rationales.96 
The court recognized that when the RRA exception was adopted in 1984, 
the exclusive focus was on protecting the music industry.97 In support of this 
argument, the court cited the Senate and House Report accompanying the RRA 
exception which specifically referred to the dangers to recording companies, 
music publishers, and songwriters.98 The court further cited the House Report 
accompanying the 1988 extension of the RRA exception.99 This report stated 
that the Register of Copyrights had questioned whether the RRA exception 
applied only to musical works or whether it extended to recorded literary 
works.100 In response, the report concluded: 
It is less likely . . . that literary works invite the same kind of long-term, 
repeated enjoyment by consumers. The problems addressed by the [RRA] 
in 1984 do not relate to recorded literary works, nor did the testimony in 
support of the legislation. In addition, during the 1988 hearings, no 
specific problems regarding the rental of recorded literary works were 
raised. The Committee concludes that if problems do arise, they may be 
addressed when the new five year “sunset” provision expires.101 
Despite this legislative history suggesting a musical focus, the court 
recognized that although “Congress intended to address concerns with musical 
recordings, as opposed to non-musical recordings, is not necessarily 
dispositive.”102 This is because Congress can write a statute to cover present 
concerns, but also has the power to address unforeseeable future concerns.103 
 Nonetheless, the court also reasoned that the RRA exception should be 
construed narrowly because it upset the balance established in the first sale 
doctrine.104 When Congress passed the RRA exception, the court explained, it 
made a specific policy choice that effectively altered the traditional copyright 
bargain and extended the copyright monopoly.105 Given the alteration to the 
balance between copyright owners and personal property owners, the court 
concluded that it would not broadly construe the RRA exception without an 
                                                                                                                                      
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][c]. 
95 Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 372 (describing other authority as including 
“other statutes, interpretations by other courts, legislative history, policy rationales, and the 




99 Id. at 373. 
100 H.R. REP. NO. 100-776, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4339, 4341. 
101 Id. See infra Part V.A.3. for criticism of this argument restricting the RRA 
exception to musical sound recordings. 
102 Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 373. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 373–74. 
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express statement from Congress to include non-musical phonorecords within 
its scope.106 
B. The Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Cornelia Kennedy, in her dissenting opinion,107 concluded the RRA 
exception does apply to non-musical phonorecords. She interpreted the clause 
“in the case of a sound recording in the musical works embodied therein” to 
mean: 
if a sound recording containing musical works is the object of the rental, 
lease, or lending, then the person engaging in such activities can only 
lawfully do so with the authorization of the owner of the copyright for 
the sound recording and the owner of the copyright for the musical works 
contained in the sound recording.108 
Because audiobooks were not musical sound recordings, Judge Kennedy 
found this clause of the RRA exception inapplicable and only the general 
provision regarding sound recordings applied.109 
Judge Kennedy then addressed the majority’s reliance on the RRA 
exception’s legislative history. First, citing the Supreme Court’s recent 
criticism of reliance upon legislative history, Judge Kennedy found it to be 
murky, ambiguous, and contradictory.110 Second, she found reliance upon 
legislative history gave unrepresentative committee members or unelected 
staffers and lobbyists the power “to attempt strategic manipulations of 
legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve through the 
statutory text.”111 Judge Kennedy concluded that because she felt the text of the 
RRA exception was clear, there was no reason to resort to the legislative 
history.112 
C. The Better-Reasoned Approach 
The majority opinion in Brilliance Audio appears to be better reasoned, but 
not necessarily correct. Although Judge Kennedy clearly believed the RRA 
exception was unambiguous, she failed to address the majority’s belief that the 
RRA exception lent itself to two interpretations. Judge Kennedy merely 
asserted that the plain reading of the text was the way she read it. She gave no 
explanation as to why the other posited interpretation of the text was erroneous. 
Although her apprehensiveness of relying on legislative history and other 
indicia of Congressional intent may be well-founded, the basis for her 
                                                          
106 Id. 
107 Judge Kennedy concurred with the majority’s decision regarding the trademark 
infringement claims, but dissented as to the copyright infringement issue. 
108 Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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interpretation of the statutory text is not articulated and provides no foundation 
for reaching her ultimate conclusion. 
On the other hand, the majority’s approach at least attempted to explain 
how the RRA exception could be read in two contrasting ways. However, the 
majority’s statement that reading the statute as including all phonorecords 
would “read the ‘musical works’ clause out of the statute”113 may be 
exaggerated. As argued by the plaintiff and recognized by the court, the statute 
could be read to apply to all phonorecords, causing the “musical works clause” 
to require the consent of the copyright owner in the musical work if the sound 
recording were a musical sound recording.114 This interpretation does not read 
the “musical works clause” out of the statute; it merely modifies the application 
of the statute and does not necessarily create any internal inconsistencies. 
Despite this overemphasis on reading the “musical works clause” out of the 
statute, the majority opinion’s approach is better-reasoned than the dissent, 
although not necessarily the best reading of the RRA exception. 
V. SHOULD THE RRA EXCEPTION BE LIMITED TO MUSICAL 
PHONORECORDS? 
Notwithstanding the decision in Brilliance Audio and this Article’s post-
decision observation, there exists a possibility that other circuits confronted 
with this same question could come to a different result. Just as one third of the 
judges in Brilliance Audio interpreted the RRA exception differently, it is not 
unimaginable that a different panel of judges could have decided two to one the 
other way. For this reason, a normative look at whether the RRA exception 
should apply to non-musical sound recordings is appropriate. This question is 
not whether the Sixth Circuit correctly interpreted the RRA exception. Rather, 
the question is whether the RRA exception should be amended to include non-
musical phonorecords within its purview. 
The question can be analyzed and critiqued through three different lenses. 
First, the scope of the RRA exception can be viewed through a legislative 
history lens to see if the rationales underlying the exception applied equally to 
non-musical sound recordings as they did to musical sound recordings. 
Likewise, the legislative history should be examined for support that the RRA 
exception does apply to non-musical sound recordings. In addition, the RRA 
exception’s legislative history distinguishing musical from non-musical 
phonorecords should be scrutinized. 
Second, the scope of the RRA exception can be viewed through a 
contemporaneous lens. Under this lens, one should look to see if today’s 
market for and threats to non-musical phonorecords is congruent to those posed 
to the music industry in 1984. 
Third, the scope of the RRA exception can be viewed through a 
prospective lens to see what the future may hold for both musical and non-
musical phonorecords, whether there is any justification for treating them 
                                                          
113 Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 372. 
114 Id. 
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differently, and whether an entirely new approach to the rental-market is 
warranted. Each of these approaches is explored infra. 
A. The Legislative History Lens 
The first approach to determine whether the RRA exception should apply 
to non-musical phonorecords is to view the questions through a legislative 
history lens. The legislative history presents three questions. First, did the 
legislative history’s stated rationales underlying the exception apply equally to 
non-musical and musical phonorecords? Second, does the legislative history 
provide any support that the RRA applies to non-musical phonorecords? Third, 
does the legislative history distinguishing musical phonorecords from non-
musical phonorecords make sense? 
1. Underlying Rationales 
Three underlying rationales for the RRA exception stand out. First, the 
legislative history concluded “that the nexus of commercial record rental and 
duplication may directly and adversely affect the ability of copyright holders to 
exercise their reproduction and distribution rights under the copyright act.”115 
This rationale merely concludes that if there are easy ways to infringe and 
renting helps the infringers accomplish their goal, then copyright owners will 
have difficulty enforcing their exclusive rights. This rationale applies equally 
well to non-musical phonorecords. Copying non-musical phonorecords in the 
1980s was just as easy as copying musical phonorecords. If someone rented 
non-musical phonographs, then this would, just as in the musical phonorecord 
context, help the infringing consumers accomplish their presumed goal of 
copying the phonorecord. Thus, the copyright owners of non-musical sound 
recordings would be just as deprived of enforcing their exclusive rights to 
distribute and reproduce. Therefore, this rationale provides no basis for 
restricting the RRA exception to musical phonorecords. 
The second rationale included in the legislative history is that sales of CDs 
were increasing, they were relatively indestructible, and their reproductions 
were of high quality.116 This rationale applies equally to non-musical 
phonorecords. CDs containing non-musical sound recordings were just as 
indestructible and their reproductions were of equally high quality. There does 
not appear to be any data suggesting that the sales of CDs in the non-musical 
market were any different from the musical market. This rationale also 
provides no basis for restricting the RRA exception to musical phonorecords. 
The third rationale included in the legislative history is that blank tapes 
were sold in the same establishment where phonorecords were rented.117 There 
is no legislative history commenting one way or the other about non-musical 
phonorecords being rented at record rental stores. With respect to blank tapes 
being sold, it might have been that blank tapes were not sold in the same stores 
                                                          
115 H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899; 
H.R. REP. NO. 100-776, at 3–4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4339, 4341. 
116 H.R. REP. NO. 100-776, at 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4339, 4340. 
117 H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899. 
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where non-musical phonorecords were rented. However, the relatively cheap 
nature of blank tapes would not have made it difficult to copy the non-musical 
phonorecord. On the other hand, there may be merit to the fact that non-
musical phonorecords, such as audiobooks or stand-up comedy albums, were 
not rented at these two hundred stores. The legislative history is simply silent 
on these issues. 
As a whole, the rationales contained in the legislative history provide little, 
if any, support for distinguishing musical from non-musical phonorecords. As a 
result, there is little, if any, reason for limiting the RRA exception only to 
musical phonorecords. 
2. Support for Extension to Non-Musical Phonographs 
There is some legislative history supporting the notion that the RRA 
exception applies to non-musical phonorecords. The 1984 House Report notes 
that “the terms ‘sound recording’ and ‘phonorecord’ are intended to have the 
same meaning as defined in section 101 of the Copyright Act. [The RRA 
exception] thus does not apply to the music or other sounds accompanying a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work.”118 The reference to “other sounds” 
in this context suggests the RRA exception was intended to apply to non-
musical sound recordings embodied in phonorecords. If the RRA exception 
only applied to musical sound recordings, then there would be no need to refer 
to the “other sounds” being excluded when they are associated with audiovisual 
works. 
The Sixth Circuit in Brilliance Audio stated that this legislative 
commentary was intended to clarify that the RRA exception did not apply to 
motion pictures.119 This is doubtful. The House Report speaks in terms of 
“music or other sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work.”120 The focus of that sentence is the music and sounds, not the motion 
picture or other audiovisual work. If Congress meant what the Sixth Circuit 
believes, it could have simply said the RRA exception “does not apply to 
motion pictures or other audiovisual works.” The Sixth Circuit’s 
misunderstanding should not mislead those considering whether the RRA 
exception should apply to non-musical phonorecords. 
Admittedly, the legislative history is sparse with respect to non-musical 
phonorecords. However, the statement that the phrases “sound recording” and 
“phonorecord” are to maintain their meaning as defined in the Copyright Act 
speaks volumes about the RRA exception’s intended applicability. Although 
the record industry bore the brunt of the lobbying efforts, as the Sixth Circuit 
pointed out in Brilliance Audio, Congress could have legislatively addressed 
issues beyond those brought to its attention by a specific lobby.121 In other 
words, it is not just the squeaky wheel that may get the Congressional grease. 
                                                          
118 Id. at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2901 (emphasis added). 
119 Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 373. 
120 H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2901. 
121 Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 373. 
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3. The Sensibility of the Stated Distinguishing Feature 
The last item to consider under the legislative history lens is the specific 
argument set forth in the 1988 House Report finding the RRA exception did 
not apply to non-musical phonorecords. When the RRA exception was up for 
renewal, the Register of Copyrights inquired as to whether it extended to 
recorded literary works.122 The Report concludes that the RRA exception did 
not extend to recorded literary works because “[i]t is less likely . . . that literary 
works invite the same kind of long-term, repeated enjoyment by consumers.”123 
In other words, the Report found the feature causing musical and non-musical 
works to be treated differently under the RRA exception was that consumers 
repeatedly listen to musical works, whereas they only listen to non-musical 
works once.124 
This argument makes no sense. The problem faced by the record industry 
was that because consumers could rent phonorecords, the record industry was 
being deprived of the opportunity to sell phonorecords to those consumers. The 
record industry was not concerned that consumers were listening to the 
phonorecords repeatedly; it was concerned they were not purchasing new 
phonorecords, which resulted in lower sales for the record industry. 
For example, in the musical context, the consumer would rent the CD, 
probably copy it, and listen to it multiple times. The consumer never purchased 
the CD. Therefore, the record industry was only selling one CD (to the record 
store), rather than selling multiple CDs (one to each consumer who rented). 
The record industry has little incentive or practical recourse to stop consumers 
from listening to copied albums on multiple occasions. On the other hand, it 
has a great incentive to stop the rental market completely. Killing this market 
causes those consumers who were renting CDs to now purchase the same.125 
This increase in sales results in additional profits for the record company. 
In the non-musical context, the consumer would rent an audiobook, listen 
to it, may or may not copy it or ever listen to it again. Regardless of how often 
the consumer listens to the audiobook, the consumer never purchases it. Just as 
in the musical context, the audiobook manufacturer only sells one audiobook 
(to the record store) rather than multiple audiobooks (one to each consumer 
who rented). It does not matter whether the consumer wants to listen to the 
audiobook multiple times or only once. 
The problem, as far as the record company or audiobook manufacturer is 
concerned, is that the CD or audiobook is available for rent. The rental is what 
inhibits sales and profits. Therefore, the legislative history’s distinction 
between musical and non-musical phonorecords is really a distinction without a 
difference. 
                                                          
122 H.R. REP. NO. 100-776, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4339, 4341. 
123 Id. 
124 This argument has also been made by commentators predicting whether the RRA 
exception applies to non-musical phonorecords. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][c]. 
125 Presumably not every rental consumer would become a purchasing consumer as 
there is some elasticity for musical phonorecords. 
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Notwithstanding the irrelevance of the multiple listening argument, it is 
also not necessarily the case that consumers only listen to non-musical sound 
recordings one time. It is not uncommon for consumers of stand-up comedy 
sound recordings to listen to the routines several times. Thus, the factual basis 
for this distinction is suspect.126 For these reasons, this piece of legislative 
history should not be relied upon in determining whether the RRA exception 
should apply to non-musical phonorecords. 
B. The Contemporaneous Lens 
The second approach to determine whether the RRA exception should 
apply to non-musical phonorecords is to view the question through a 
contemporaneous lens to see how the non-musical phonorecord industry 
compares to the musical phonorecord industry of 1984. Depending on the 
similarities shared between these industries, an extension of the RRA exception 
to non-musical phonorecords might be warranted. 
In the early 1980s, there were approximately 200 rental stores throughout 
the United States renting musical phonorecords for twenty-four to seventy-two 
hour periods for fees ranging from 99¢ to $2.50 per phonorecord.127 Moreover, 
the stores also sold blank audio cassette tapes at the same time.128 Also, it 
should be remembered that Congress passed the RRA exception despite its 
recognition that the number of record rental retailers was relatively small, 
because the development of inexpensive audio taping equipment and CDs gave 
the commercial rental of phonorecords the prospects of a viable business 
venture.129 
Today’s non-musical phonorecord rental market is quite extensive. Several 
online rental establishments exist for audiobooks.130 These online audiobook 
rental establishments offer various pricing options, including monthly or annual 
                                                          
126 See also NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][c] n.138 (noting that the underlying 
assumption for this reasoning is open to serious question). 
127 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
128 Id. 
129 H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 2 n.6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899 
n.6. 
130 See, e.g., Booksfree.com, http://www.booksfree.com; Audiobooks.com, 
http://www.audiobooks.com; Simply Audiobooks, http://www.simplyaudiobooks.com; On 
the Go Books, http://www.onthegobooks.com; Recorded Books, LLC, 
http://www.recordedbooks.com; Audio Diversions, http://www.audiodiversions.com. 
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subscriptions, permitting the customer to unlimited rentals,131 or renting per 
audiobook.132 
Beyond the online establishments, physical rental markets also exist. For 
example, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store with 553 company-owned units in 
forty-one states133 offers its customers a selection of over 200 audiobook titles 
at every location.134 These audiobooks can be purchased at any location and 
can be returned for the purchase price minus a $3.49 per week charge.135 In 
comparison to the 99¢ to $2.50 rental fees for one to three days of use in the 
early 1980s, a one week rental for $3.49 is proportionally cheaper.136 
The Cracker Barrel Old Country Store rental program alone is already 
more widespread than the threat of 200 rental establishments facing the music 
industry in the early 1980s. The online rental establishments pose an increased 
risk over physical locations because of their ability to easily transact business 
with consumers throughout the country (and the world). In fact, one of the 
major limitations on rental establishments in the early 1980s was that their 
consumers were generally from a local geographic range. The presence of an 
online rental market for non-musical phonorecords extinguishes this limitation. 
The combination of physical and online rental establishments demonstrates that 
the rental market facing non-musical phonorecords is more developed and 
extensive than that facing the music industry in the early 1980s when the RRA 
exception was adopted. 
Another concern in the early 1980s was that blank audio cassette tapes 
were fairly cheap and facilitated copying.137 Today, blank CDs can be 
purchased at any electronics retailer for a negligible cost (less than 30¢ per 
CD). Again, today’s low cost of blank media is similar to, if not cheaper than, 
the blank audio cassettes of the early 1980s. This too shows the similarities 
between the musical phonorecord rental market of the early 1980s, when the 
RRA exception was enacted, and the non-musical phonorecord rental market of 
today. 
                                                          
131 See, e.g., Booksfree.com, Available Membership Plans, http://www.booksfree.com/ 
available_plans.shtml (subscriptions ranging from $9.99 to $37.99 per month); 
Audiobooks.com, How to Rent, http://www.audiobooks.com/php/ 
howto.php?cmd=Rent&h=1 (subscriptions ranging from $30.00 to $50.00 per month); 
Simply Audiobooks’ Rental Club, http://www.simplyaudiobooks.com/Learn-More-Rent/ 
dp/45/ (subscriptions ranging from $14.95 to $39.95 per month or from $11.95 to $36.95 per 
year); On the Go Books, http://www.onthegobooks.com/ 
aux_page.php?page_key=aux_page_3 (subscriptions ranging from $16.95 to $37.95 per 
month or from $11.95 to $33.95 every six months). 
132 See, e.g., Recorded Books, http://www.recordedbooks.com; Audio Diversions 
http://www.audiodiversions.com/. 
133 Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Press Kit: Information About the Cracker Barrel 
Old Country Store, http://www.crackerbarrel.com/mediaroom-presskit.cfm?doc_id=1118. 
134 Audio Book Rental from Cracker Barrel,  
http://www.crackerbarrel.com/trip-booksaudio.cfm?doc_id=48. 
135 Id. 
136 This, of course, ignores the time value of money issue, which further strengthens the 
argument that today’s rental rates are equal to or less than those in the early 1980s. 
137 See Horowitz, supra note 24, at 33 (noting that blank audio cassettes were offered 
for sale, frequently at substantial discounts). 
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Again, it is important to remember that in the early 1980s, Congress was 
concerned with the prospects of a viable rental market.138 Today’s non-musical 
phonorecord rental market is more than a prospect—it is a reality. The market 
is more extensive and less expensive than what faced the music industry in the 
early 1980s and the media for copying these works is comparable. The music 
industry appears pleased (or at least not displeased) with the additional 
protection the RRA exception granted and the success it had at eliminating 
phonorecord rentals. There have been no efforts on the music industry’s part to 
repeal the RRA exception. Presumably, the non-musical phonorecord industry 
would be equally pleased with the same results (i.e. fewer rentals, increased 
sales, and increased profits). 
Looking at the RRA exception through a contemporaneous lens 
demonstrates that the problems faced by the industries during their respective 
time periods are sufficiently similar. Thus, the contemporaneous lens suggests 
and provides strong support for Congress amending the RRA exception to 
include non-musical phonorecords. 
C. The Prospective Lens 
The third approach to determine whether the RRA exception should apply 
to non-musical phonorecords is to view the question through a prospective lens 
to see what the future may hold for both musical and non-musical sound 
recordings and whether there is any justification for treating them differently 
under the RRA exception. This section will initially explore the impact of 
downloadable media upon the first sale doctrine and RRA exception. Because 
of the changing technological and legal landscapes, an entirely new approach to 
rental markets is suggested. Lastly, this section analyzes the future of non-
downloadable phonorecords to determine whether different treatment of 
musical and non-musical phonorecords is warranted. 
1. The Future Concerning Downloadable Sound Recordings 
Downloading audiobooks and music has been on the rise. The audiobook 
sector showing the most growth was downloadable sales.139 Downloads 
accounted for 6% of sales of audiobooks in 2004, but increased to 9% in 
2005.140 The same appears true for musical sound recordings. In the music 
industry, the percentage of sales via digital download increased from 0.2% in 
2001 to 5.7% in 2005.141 Although these rises were concerned with sales, not 
rentals, it does not seem unreasonable that audiobook rentals could follow the 
same course if a downloadable rental market were created (e.g. the ability to 
rent MP3s). As of today, there do not appear to be any downloadable rentals for 
                                                          
138 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
139 Audio Publishers Association, Audio Publishers Association (APA) Fact Sheet 
(2005), http://www.audiopub.org/files/public/APA_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
140 Audio Publishers Association, Audio Publishing Industry Continues to Grow; 
Shows 4.7% Increase in Sales, at 2, http://www.audiopub.org/files/public/ 
APASalesSurveyResultsFactSheet2006COMPLETE.pdf. 
141 Recording Industry Association of America, 2005 Consumer Profile, 
http://www.riaa.com (follow “Consumer Trends” hyperlink; then follow “2005” hyperlink). 
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audiobooks, but that could change if an entrepreneurial audiobook listener 
thought there was a market. 
If a download rental market were created, then the music, audiobook, and 
stand-up comedy industries would not necessarily be concerned for two 
reasons. The first reason is the use of digital rights management (“DRM”). 
DRM refers collectively to technologies used by copyright owners to control 
access to and usage of digital media in an effort to enforce copyrights and 
prevent infringement.142 Using DRM, a copyright owner can encode each 
electronic work with an array of “technological fences” to control the work’s 
subsequent use.143 An example of DRM is Apple’s iTunes, which encodes 
songs to prevent consumers from posting them online in a readable format for 
others to listen to.144 This, to a certain extent, prevents unlawful copying and 
distribution. DRM could also be utilized in the download rental market to 
restrict or prevent copying and to self-terminate after the rental period expires. 
The second reason the music, audiobook, and stand-up comedy industries 
would not necessarily be concerned with download rental markets is because 
there currently is no digital first sale doctrine. It must be remembered that the 
Copyright Act’s first sale doctrine is only applicable to owners of particular 
copies or phonorecords and copies, and phonorecords are material objects.145 A 
downloaded file, such as an MP3, is not itself a material object.146 Once the file 
is burned to a CD, then the CD becomes a phonorecord, but the file itself does 
not constitute a material object. As such, a renter of downloadable music or 
audiobooks would not be protected by the first sale doctrine. 
Nonetheless, there is a real possibility that Congress could change the 
Copyright Act to create a digital first sale doctrine that would grant consumers 
of downloaded music, audiobooks, or comedy routines the right to resell and 
rent these files. In 2001, the Copyright Office, as requested by Congress when 
it enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), prepared a report 
addressing the relationship between existing and emergent technology, and 
section 109 of the Copyright Act.147 In its report, the Copyright Office did not 
recommend amending the Copyright Act to expand the first sale doctrine to 
digital transmissions of copyrighted works.148 Proponents of a digital first sale 
doctrine drew an analogy between transmitting digital works and circulating 
goods in the physical realm, but this analogy was rejected by the Copyright 
Office because it ultimately relied upon either a voluntary or automatic deletion 
                                                          
142 Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works: Adapting the 
First Sale Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 
29 (2002). 
143 Id. 
144 Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/ 
thoughtsonmusic. 
145 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
146 See Brian Mencher, Digital Transmissions: To Boldly Go Where No First Sale 
Doctrine Has Gone Before, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 47, 63 (2002). 
147 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT (2001), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf. 
148 Id. at 80. 
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of the file, both of which were unworkable at the time.149 However, the report 
acknowledged that changes could occur in the market that may invite Congress 
to revisit the issue.150 As discussed, supra, the technological landscape has 
changed substantially since 2001, with DRM now becoming standard in the 
online music industry.151 The notion of DRM being unworkable is, and will 
continue to be, outdated. As stated by one commentator, DRM “is the wave of 
the present and the future.”152 Therefore, it is not unlikely that Congress may 
revisit the issue of creating a digital first sale doctrine that includes, not only 
copies and phonorecords, but also extends to non-tangible files that can be 
transferred without the need of a physical and tangible embodiment. 
If Congress created a digital first sale doctrine, but failed to amend the 
RRA exception, then the music and audiobook industries would face a major 
problem—the RRA exception would not apply to these digital files. Again, 
there would be no material object for the sound recording, and thus no 
phonorecord to protect under the RRA exception. 
With the legal protection gone, the music, audiobook, and stand-up 
comedy industries are only left with DRM to protect their copyrights. And 
although this may very well be sufficient,153 it has been noted that DRM is a 
cat-and-mouse game where hackers successfully discover methods to work 
around the DRM and the copyright owners must employ new technologies to 
stay ahead of the game.154 Moreover, there is a movement underway to sell 
digital sound recordings that are free of DRM technology.155 Given these 
potential struggles facing the industries, is there an alterative solution 
benefiting both the industries and consumers? 
One approach is for the industries to promote licensing, rather than sales, 
of musical and non-musical sound recordings, because the first sale doctrine 
does not apply to licensed phonorecords.156 As suggested by one commentator, 
consumers will likely prefer to license sound recordings if they can be assured 
that technological advances will not leave them with outdated media.157 
The argument is as follows. As technology advances, most digital files 
will become obsolete to the consumer within approximately five years.158 The 
industries can provide up-to-date sound recording files and offer consumers an 
                                                          
149 Id. at 97–98. 
150 Id. at 100. 
151 See generally Jobs, supra note 144. 
152 Graham, supra note 142, at 29. 
153 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAW OF CYBERSPACE 126 (1999) (arguing 
DRM will increasingly displace law as the primary defender of intellectual property in 
cyberspace). 
154 Jobs, supra note 144. 
155 Apple Unveils Higher Quality DRM-Free Music on the iTunes Store, 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.html. 
156 See generally Eurie Hayes Smith IV, Digital First Sale: Friend or Foe?, 22 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 853 (2005); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
157 Hayes Smith, supra note 156, at 859–60. 
158 Id. at 859. 
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option between purchasing and licensing the file.159 If the consumer purchases 
the file, the consumer alone is responsible for any losses, deletions, or 
corruptions that occur.160 The purchasing consumer would also be permitted to 
sell, rent, or otherwise dispose of the file pursuant to the first sale doctrine.161 
Over time, the purchased file will become obsolete and increasingly unusable, 
forcing the consumer to purchase an updated version of the sound recording.162 
On the other hand, if the consumer opted to license the sound recording, 
their rights could be limited to the specific rights granted by the industries 
under the license agreement.163 And while the consumers would not own a 
copy of the file, they would be given additional benefits, including the right to 
access multiple file formats and replacement for lost, deleted, or corrupted 
files.164 Keeping the costs of licensing below the costs of purchasing should 
lead consumers away from purchasing and towards licensing.165 
In this scenario everyone wins. The consumers have the option of 
choosing which rights best suit them, but will more likely choose the licensing 
option given the cheaper price and additional benefits. For the industries, two 
benefits inure. First, a stream of income would result for each sound recording 
licensed and for any fees involved with updating or replacing licensed files.166 
Second, the number of purchasers of sound recording files, as opposed to 
licensees, would decline, thus reducing the number of individuals able to assert 
the first sale doctrine defense.167 
Therefore, if we look towards the future of music and audiobooks, we can 
see that although the problem facing the music and audiobook industry is not 
an immediate threat, there is a practical, technological, and mutually agreeable 
way to avoid the potential problem. 
2. The Future of Traditional Phonorecord Rentals 
Notwithstanding the shift to non-phonorecord downloadable media, there 
still exists a phonorecord market for musical and non-musical works. The Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Brilliance Audio provides an incentive to those wishing to 
enter the non-musical phonorecord rental market. As of now, they are free to 
rent non-musical phonorecords under the first sale doctrine without fear of 
infringement claims based on the RRA exception. As explained, supra, the 
rental market facing audiobook publishers is more extensive than what the 
music industry faced in the early 1980s.168 Although the uncertainty of the 
RRA exception’s applicability to non-musical phonorecords may have 
previously caused those considering entering the rental market to pause or 






164 Id. at 859–60. 
165 Id. at 860. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 See supra Part V.B. 
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abstain, this anxiety-causing hurdle has been removed and exacerbates the 
problem facing the audiobook industry to levels well beyond what faced the 
music industry in the early 1980s. Therefore, even if DRM is successful and 
Congress refuses to expand the first sale doctrine to digital, non-tangible 
formats, viewing this problem under the prospective lens still suggests 
amending the RRA exception to expressly include non-musical phonorecords. 
VI. SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
After looking at the issue through these three different lenses, it seems that 
Congress should amend the RRA exception to include non-musical 
phonorecords within its ambit. The legislative history lens suggests the 
underlying rationales for the RRA exception apply almost equally to non-
musical phonorecords as it did to musical phonorecords.169 Moreover, there is 
legislative history suggesting expansion and the legislative history’s argument 
for distinguishing these phonorecords makes no sense.170 Likewise, the 
contemporaneous and prospective lenses also promote expanding the RRA 
exception’s scope to non-musical phonorecords. The contemporaneous lens 
shows the threat of rental markets facing the non-musical sound recording 
industry is more extreme than that facing the music industry in the 1980s.171 
The prospective lens demonstrates that the current state of the law and possible 
development will only fuel this rental market growth.172 
Even if Congress chooses not to expand the scope of the RRA exception, 
it should be amended nonetheless. As it stands now, it is poorly drafted. To 
avoid a future split in the circuits and to further advise audiobook publishers, 
authors and stand-up comics who record their works, and consumers about 
their rights with respect to the rental market of phonorecords, Congress should 
amend the RRA exception. Two options are provided, infra, depending on 
which option Congress chooses. 
A. Expanding the Scope of Sound Recordings 
If Congress determines the scope of the RRA exception should be 
expanded to include all phonorecords, consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s 
dissent in Brilliance Audio, then the following amendment to the first sentence 
of section 109(b)(1)(A) should be made: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), unless authorized by 
the owners of copyright in the sound recording, and if a musical sound 
recording then the owners of copyright in the musical works embodied 
therein, or the owner of copyright in a computer program (including any 
tape, disk, or other medium embodying such program), neither the owner 
of a particular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular 
copy of a computer program (including any tape, disk, or other medium 
                                                          
169 See supra Part V.A.1. 
170 See supra Part V.A.2. and V.A.3. 
171 See supra Part V.B. 
172 See supra Part V.C.2. 
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embodying such program), may, for the purposes of direct or indirect 
commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the 
possession of that phonorecord or computer program (including any tape, 
disk, or other medium embodying such program) by rental, lease, or 
lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or 
lending.173 
This amendment moves the clause referring to “the owners of copyright in 
the musical works embodied therein” so it follows the clause referring to 
musical sound recordings. The splicing of the two clauses referring to sound 
recordings in the current version of the RRA174 and inserting a reference to 
computer programs between them adds confusion to this already-disoriented 
statute. In addition, this amendment adds a clause clarifying that consent of the 
copyright owner of the musical works is only necessary if the sound recording 
is a musical sound recording. Otherwise, only the consent of the copyright 
owner of the sound recording is necessary. The use of the if/then language of 
this clause leaves open the option that sound recordings other than musical 
sound recordings are encompassed by the RRA exception. 
B. Limiting Sound Recordings to Musical Works 
If Congress determines the scope of the RRA exception should be limited 
to musical phonorecords, consistent with the majority’s decision in Brilliance 
Audio, then the following amendment to the first sentence of section 
109(b)(1)(A) should be made: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), unless authorized by 
the owners of copyright in the musical sound recording and the owners 
of copyright in the musical works embodied therein, or the owner of 
copyright in a computer program (including any tape, disk, or other 
medium embodying such program), neither the owner of a particular 
musical phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular copy of 
a computer program (including any tape, disk, or other medium 
embodying such program), may, for the purposes of direct or indirect 
commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the 
possession of that phonorecord or computer program (including any tape, 
disk, or other medium embodying such program) by rental, lease, or 
lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or 
lending.175 
This amendment adds the modifier “musical” before “sound recording” 
and “phonorecord” to limit the scope. Moreover, this amendment, like the 
amendment expanding the RRA exception’s scope, moves the clause referring 
to “the owners of copyright in the musical works embodied therein” so it 
follows the clause referring to musical sound recordings.176 As discussed supra, 
                                                          
173 Emphasis added to illustrate changes in the statute. 
174 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). 
175 Emphasis added to illustrate changes in the statute. 
176 See supra Part VI.A. 
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the splicing of the two clauses and inserting the reference to computer 
programs between them causes more confusion than already exists.177 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For over twenty years, the courts have not had an opportunity to determine 
whether the RRA exception applies to non-musical phonorecords. Surprisingly, 
this poorly phrased statute had largely managed to escape judicial attention. 
However, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brilliance Audio finally answered this 
lingering question. 
Given the historical background of the first sale doctrine and the RRA 
exception, it may be that the Sixth Circuit decided the issue correctly. This 
Article does not take issue with the court’s conclusion, but instead uses the 
differing conclusions of the majority and dissent to illustrate that the RRA 
exception is in need of Congressional clarification. 
Congress, standing at the crossroads between these interpretations, has the 
power to clarify the scope of the RRA and direct the courts and the public as to 
what are and are not protected activities under the Copyright Act. By viewing 
the issue through three different lenses, Congress should see that expanding the 
scope of the RRA exception to include non-musical phonorecords is justified. 
If it agrees, a proposed amendment to the RRA exception is detailed, supra.178 
However, there is also support for limiting the RRA exception in the way set 
forth by the Sixth Circuit’s majority in Brilliance Audio. If Congress 
determines the RRA exception should remain limited in scope, then a proposed 
amendment to the RRA is also detailed, supra.179 Regardless of Congress’ 
ultimate decision on how to amend the RRA exception, it is without doubt that 
this statute needs Congressional attention. The existence and recent and 
potential growth of an audiobook rental market will only be increased by the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brilliance Audio, thus inviting future uncertainty 
and a potential split amongst the circuits on the issue. A minor amendment to 
the RRA exception can save the courts, the audiobook and comedy industries, 
and consumers from wasting time and money further litigating this issue. 
 
 
                                                          
177 Id. 
178 See supra Part VI.A. 
179 See supra Part VI.B. 
